Benign Quotas: A Plan for Integrated Private Housing (Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, N.D. Ill. 1960) by unknown
BENIGN QUOTAS: A PLAN FOR INTEGRATED PRIVATE
HOUSING*
PROGRESS Development Corporation was organized to construct and sell
racially integrated single occupancy housing in Deerfield, Illinois, an all white
upper middleclass suburb of Chicago.I In April, 1959, and at subsequent
dates, Progress acquired twenty-two acres of land on which it intended to
erect fifty-one homes.2 Because Negroes comprised approximately twenty per
cent of the population in the greater Chicago area, the developer decided to
sell from ten to twelve homes to Negroes.3 In order to maintain the initial
Negro-white ratio, Progress planned to request each purchaser to execute a
resale agreement giving it the right to select subsequent purchasers. 4 The
developer contemplated that these agreements would enable it to ensure that
each parcel of property would remain occupied by a person of the same race
as the original owner.5
In November of the same year, after Progress had partially constructed two
model homes, it revealed its intention to sell to Negroes.6 Strong objections
arose in the community, resulting in the formation of an active resident
opposition group.7 A bond issue to raise funds for the purchase and construc-
*Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, No. 59 C 2050, N.D. Ill., March 4, 1960.
1. Progress Development Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Modern Com-
munity Developers, Inc. of Princeton, New Jersey. The latter is headed by Morris
Milgram whose organization had previously constructed private integrated housing in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania. See Dykeman & Stokely, "The South" in the North, N.Y.
Times, April 17, 1960, § 6, p. 8, 83-86; Time, Dec. 7, 1959, p. 23; National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, Trends in Housing, Vol. III, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1959,
pp. 4-5; Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, No. 59 C 2050, N.D. Ill., March 4, 1960 [here-
inafter cited as Progress opinion]. In July, 1960, the case was pending appeal to the
7th Circuit (Civ. No. 12976).
2. Progress opinion at 9-10.
3. Id. at 52.
4. Id. at 53. But see Brief for Appellant, p. 41, Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, No.
12976, 7th Cir., brief filed, June, 1960 (claiming that the use of such agreements was only
"under consideration").
A similar method for maintaining the initial ratio was previously employed by Mil-
gram in his Pennsylvania development, Concord Park:
Concord Park has attempted to maintain the interracial character of the develop-
ment through a technique which has been used by other developers to prevent their
housing from becoming interracial. At the time of settlement, both Negro and white
buyers are presented with a resale agreement in which the buyer agrees to give
the builder first option to buy back his house in the event he wishes to resell.
Signing of the agreement is not mandatory on the purchaser, but most sign.
GRIER & GRIER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTERRACIAL HouSING 208 (1960).
5. Progress opinion at 53-54.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 26.
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tion of six new park sites, including Progress's land, was overwhelmingly
approved in a December referendum." Deerfield voters had previously defeated
an August parks referendum in which the purchase of part of the developer's
land had apparently been proposed.9 Three days after the December referen-
dum, the Deerfield Park District instituted proceedings to condemn Progress's
land.' 0 Progress thereupon brought suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act 11
seeking to enjoin the Park District from proceeding with the condemnation
plan, which was alleged to be an abuse of the power of eminent domain.' 2
Further allegations charged a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs bf their right
to hold, sell, and convey real property.' 3 The federal district court dismissed
the complaint, finding that Progress had failed to prove bias or discrimination
by the defendants in taking the action complained of, and that the December
referendum had merely carried into effect a general plan for park acquisition
made six months before Progress had disclosed its intentions.' 4
More important was the court's comment that under Shelley v. Kraemer
the resale agreements which Progress planned to elicit from each purchaser
would be unenforceable.', Later in the opinion, the court held that plaintiff's
resale agreements were not only unenforceable but also that the act of making
them was unlawful,16 and that plaintiffs were therefore barred under the
"clean hands" doctrine from claiming equitable relief.". The finding of unlaw-
fulness was based upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Hughes v. Superior
Court '8 and Shelley v. Kraemer.19 Neither decision supports this finding.
In Hughes, the Supreme Court held only that a California policy, enjoining
picketing which seeks to bring about a racial quota hiring system, did not
contravene federal guarantees of free speech; the Court did not hold quota
systems unlawful as a matter of federal law.20 And, as the district court
8. Id. at 31. On this occasion, in a record turnout of voters, the village decided
2,635 to 1,207 in favor of acquiring the land for parks. Dykeman & Stokely, supra note
1, at 84-85.
9. See Progress opinion at 24, 29. The court merely stated that all Progress's
property had been incorporated in a prior park plan, and that one tract had not been
included in the August referendum.
10. Id. at 31.
11. 14 Stat. 27 (1866), as amended, 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1988
(1958); 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1958); 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985 (1958).
12. Progress opinion at 15.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 29-30, 69.
15. Id. at 19-20.
16. Id. at 54, 71.
17. Id. at 71.
18. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
19. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
20. Id. at 466-67.
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seemed to recognize earlier in its opinion,21 the unconstitutional conduct found
in Shelley was of necessity state action, the judicial enforcement of a discrimi-
natory contract. 22 Progress, acting solely as a private citizen, was in this
instance incapable of state action.2 3 Furthermore, the district court misapplied
the "clean hands" doctrine, for that doctrine is applicable only where the
plaintiff's inequitable conduct affects the immediate defendant.
24
Nevertheless, Progress is the first case in the private housing field to discuss
the enforceability of a "controlled occupancy pattern"-commonly known
as a "benign quota."25 Despite its erroneous finding of unlawful conduct, the
court's basic premise, that benign quota resale agreements are judicially un-
enforceable, might, if accepted, substantially hinder the development of private
integrated housing.
Although presently comprising only a minute portion of the total complex
of housing in the United States, over fifty privately developed interracial
projects have been completed, varying in size from under 25 to over 300
units.26 Experience with public interracial housing has indicated that "it is
difficult to maintain a racially mixed pattern of living once the proportion of
nonwhite tenants exceeds'40 to 60"per cent."' 27 Thus, without enforceable quota
controls an initially integrated development may eventually come to be occupied
exclusively by members of the minority group. The failure of integrated housing
might well impede the progress of integration in other areas of community
activity. This relationship is most apparent where public school districts
conform to residential patterns, but its effects are also felt elsewhere:
In all regions of the nation, restriction of colored citizens to certain areas
creates de facto separate neighborhoods and public facilities-including
21. Earlier, the court had stated that Progress was free to enter into restrictive
agreements, commenting only that they could not be enforced. Progress opinion at 19-20.
22. 334 U.S. at 14-18.
23. Private groups may be held responsible for state action when performing activi-
ties in place of the state, see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Texas Democratic
Primary), or when acting with governmental powers, cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) ("Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining repre-
sentative with powers comparable to those possessed by legislatures").
24. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 399, at 97 (5th ed. 1941).
25. A 'benign quota' is a system under which a fixed ratio is established in terms
of race or ethnic origin for the occupancy of a housing development, for the
purpose of achieving and maintaining integration.
Hartman & Leskes, Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell (Joint Memorandum of
The American Jewish Committee & The Anti-Defamation League) March 29, 1960, p. 3.
26. GRIER & GRIER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 12.
27. Weaver, Integration in Public and Private Housing, Annals, March, 1956, p. 86;
see ABRAMs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 311 (1955). But see GRIER & GRIER, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 205-08 (tending to dispute this conclusion). Grier's study, however, unlike those
of Weaver and Abrams, deals exclusively with private integrated housing, the vast
majority of which has been constructed since World War II. Id. at 10. Thus, even Grier
acknowledges that "it is not yet possible to make firm generalizations on the long-run
racial stability of interracial developments." Id, at 205.
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schools- thereby delaying participation and acceptance of nonwhites in
the educational, political, economic, and social aspects of American life."8
Because of its far reaching effects, therefore, the Progress court's conclusion
that controlled occupancy plans cannot be judicially enforced merits further
examination. Progress's motives ostensibly distinguish their Deerfield plan
from the restrictive covenants denied enforcement in Shelley v. Kraemer, and
on that basis a variety of arguments may be advanced in opposition to the
position taken by the district court.
Two distinctions between the Shelley and Progress cases are immediately
apparent. Shelley involved an agreement signed by 30 of 39 property owners,
which provided that no non-Caucasions should occupy any of the property so
covered for a period of 50 years.29 Notwithstanding this covenant, a Negro
family obtained a warranty deed to a parcel of property and other parties to
the covenant brought suit to divest them of title. The United States Supreme
Court held that judicial enforcement of such a covenant would be "state action"
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 0 In
contrast, a Progress-type resale agreement would probably make no mention
of race, but would merely give the developer the right to choose future
purchasers.3 Thus, an evidentiary problem not present in Shelley is raised.
The Shelley covenant showed exclusion because of race on its face; in a benign
quota case, exclusion on this basis could not be shown without independent
evidence. Such evidence might be especially difficult to obtain because of the
biracial character of the development. And unless it can be shown that the
developer is seeking to enforce the resale agreement for the purpose of racial
exclusion, the Shelley doctrine will not apply.32 The evidentiary problem
may not be significant, however, since the developer of private integrated
housing is unlikely to conceal the racial basis for enforcing his resale agree-
ments.3 3 Even if the developer's motives are not made public, evidence of
28. Weaver, supra note 27; see C. JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 8
(1943); TENENBAUM, WHY MEN HATE 333 (1947):
Anyone who has investigated the problem of group tensions has always ended up
with the belief that nothing radical can be achieved until walls of segregated,
hemmed-in, ghetto living have been destroyed.
29. 334 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948).
30. Id. at 20.
31. Progress opinion at 53-54. To enforce the quota system, the developer need only
have the power of selecting subsequent purchasers.
32. The Shelley holding was directed solely at "racially restrictive" covenants.
It should be observed that these covenants do not seek to proscribe any particular
use of the affected properties .... The excluded class is defined wholly in terms
of race or color; "simply that and nothing more."
334 U.S. at 10.
33. Progress's parent corporation does not attempt to hide the fact that they feel
a definite need for racial controls. See Wallace, The Techniques of Selling Integrated
Housing, p. 2, reprinted from Journal of Intergroup Relations, July, 1958, by Modem
Community Developers, Inc.
1960]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
continued adherence to a quota system might be sufficient to establish a pattern
of systematic exclusion.-4
The benign motives of interracial developers may furnish a second and more
important ground for distinguishing Shelley. The restrictive covenant in
Shelley was designed to exclude Negroes,30 whereas benign quota resale agree-
ments are designed to maintain integration.36 The builder seeks to prevent
the development from becoming all-Negro by limiting, not excluding, members
of both races. A court, however, may conclude that the developer's overall
motives are not determinative. A party prevented from purchasing a home
because the quota for his race has been filled may reply that, despite the de-
velopers good motives, he as an individual has been excluded solely because
of his race, and that his right to equal protection of the laws, a personal right,3 T
has therefore been violated. The fact that whites may also be excluded is
irrelevant. As stated in Shelley, "the equal protection of the law which the
Fourteenth Amendment affords is not achieved through indiscriminate impo-
sition of inequalities."3 8
Developers might rely on Barrows v. Jackson,3 9 however, to argue that a
court should weigh the prospective interests of other members of the race
against the personal rights of the excluded individual. In Barrows, one co-
covenantor sought damages from another for breach of a restrictive covenant.
If damages had been allowed, no one would have been denied the right to
purchase a home because of his race, since the defendant had alrady conveyed
his property to a Negro.40 But according to the majority opinion:
If a state court awards damages for breach of a restrictive covenant, a
prospective seller of restricted land will either refuse to sell to non-
Caucasians or else will require non-Caucasians to pay a higher price to
meet the damages which the seller may incur. Solely because of their
race, non-Caucasians will be unable to purchase, own, and enjoy property
on the same terms as Caucasians. 41
By considering the possible effects on persons not parties to the immediate
suit, the Court, in effect, allowed one person to plead the civil rights of an
unidentified group. If this was possible, the developer might argue, why
34. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (Negroes called to grand jury
duty never exceeded ratio of Negroes to whites) ; cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935).
35. 334 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948).
36. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 40-41, Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, No. 12976,
7th Cir., brief filed, June, 1960.
37. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ; Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 662-63 (1948) (concurring opinion); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337, 351 (1938); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62
(1914).
38. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
39. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
40. Id. at 252.
41. Id. at 254.
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should not a court allow him to plead the interests of those persons who
would benefit from the integrated housing afforded by his controlled occupancy
plan? Barrows, however, makes clear that the individual cannot request state
action which "results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other
individuals."4 Consideration of nonlitigants' rights in Barrows did not offend
this principle, but rather broadened the scope of the constitutional right
protected. 43 In contrast, a court faced with the prospect of enforcing a resale
agreement could give weight to the interests of the general group only at the
expense of the particular individual being excluded.
The difficulty in securing enforcement of resale agreements is further demon-
strated by the judicial reaction to systems of planned integration which have
been implemented by state executive departments or legislatures. If the right
to equal protection of the laws is violated by state action of this nature, it may
also be violated if such action is taken by the judiciary.44 Banks v. Housing
Authority,45 decided by a California district court of appeals, presented the
question in its clearest form: "Does the distribution of public housing on the
basis of the proportionate needs of racial groups . . . satisfy the requirement
[of the fourteenth amendment] that individuals are entitled to equal protection
of the law?' ' 40 The Public Housing Authority of San Francisco had estab-
lished an administrative policy of apportioning public dwelling units to racial
groups on a quota basis. The quota fixed for each project was designed to
"maintain and preserve the same racial composition which exists in the
neighborhood where a project is located." 47 This plan was unacceptable to
the California court which held that the Housing Authority could not "observe,
encourage, and foster a neighborhood racial pattern when . . . such a course
of conduct results in unequal treatment of persons otherwise eligible to receive
and obtain . . . housing accommodations. '48 Moreover, the court observed,
the Authority's policy emphasized existing patterns of neighborhood segrega-
tion, patterns which might have been initiated through the same type of re-
42. Id. at 260, quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
43. Other cases which allow pleading of nonlitigants' rights also do so only to broaden
'the right protected. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915); Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192
Pac. 1021 (1920); cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
44. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 113 (1935); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680
(1930) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 548 (1922) ; Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370, 397 (1880) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
45. 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
974 (1954).It has been speculated that because the case was before the Supreme Court
at the same time as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "consideration
of the same issue in housing was not necessary." Note, 31 IND. L.J. 501, 505 (1956).
46. 120 Cal. App. 2d at 8-9, 260 P.2d at 673.
47. Id. at 5, 260 P.2d at 671.
48. Id. at 18, 260 P.2d at 678.
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strictive covenants which Shelley held unenforceable.49 The California court's
observations are equally applicable to Progress's Deerfield plan, for the Deer-
field plan perpetuates another kind of racial inequality. Chicago area Negroes,
after years of limited opportunity to purchase adequate housing,50 may require
a greater percentage of new housing than their numbers in the community
would indicate. By placing an arbitrary limit on the number of houses avail-
able to Negroes, the Deerfield plan perpetuates the existing discriminatory
pattern. Thus the Banks opinion not only evidences disapproval of housing
quotas, but also points out additional reasons for rejecting an apparently
"benign" quota.
State action analogous to the Banks quota system occurred when, following
the School Segregation cases,51 the New York City Board of Education an-
nounced a plan to attain "racially integrated schools." '5 2 Although school
segregation is illegal in New York,53 residential patterns and the use of geo-
graphically defined school districts have caused a concentration of ethnic
groups in certain schools. To alter this pattern, New York planned, first, to
rezone these districts and, second, to consider integration as a relevant factor
in selecting schools for those children whose assignment could more easily
be changed because, in any case, they had to be transported to school.5 4 In
effect, the New York City Board of Education had interpreted the Brown
decisions as approving a planned integrated school system. If the Supreme
Court has ordered planned integration in schooling, Progress might argue, how
can it be unconstitutional for a court to enforce a system of planned integration
in housing ?55 Several federal courts, however, dispute this view of Brown."'
Their decisions interpret that case as holding, not that the states must affirma-
tively integrate the schools, but that they must refrain from purposely segre-
gating them.
The Constitution as construed in the School Segregation Cases... forbids
any state action requiring segregation of children in public schools solely
49. Id. at 17, 260 P.2d at 678.
50. See generally Frey, "Freedom of Residence" in Illinois, 41 CHi. BAR REcoRD 9
(1959).
51. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (second Brown decision).
52. See 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 231, 507, 1037 (1957); N.Y. Times, July 27, 1957,
p. 1, col. 5.
53. N.Y. EDuc. LAws § 3201.
54. See note 52 supra.
55. See Note, Racial Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 550 (1959)
(discussing the use of quota systems in public housing).
56. Jones v. Alexandria School Bd., 28 U.S.L. WEaic 2554 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Shuttles-
worth v. Birmingham Bd. of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam,
358 U.S. 101 (1958) ; Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957), modified, 256
F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958); Avery v. Wichita Falls Inde-
pendent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) ; Briggs




on account of race; it does not, however, require actual integration of
the races.57
Active integration is required only where a state has deliberately perpetuated
a segregated school system. s In the light of these holdings, the untested
New York plan, later modified for other reasons,r 9 was based upon an errone-
ous interpretation of the Brown decisions, and those cases cannot be relied
upon to show approval of state attempts affirmatively to integrate the races.
Thus, the Progress court's disapproval of controlled occupancy plans seems
proper under present law. Despite the intent to maintain integrated housing,
such plans necessarily involve exclusion on the basis of race, and are therefore
unenforceable under Shelley. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
any affirmative governmental action-whether through the legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial branch-which recognizes racial differences is unconstitutional. 60
Only in the most exceptional circumstances has the Constitution not been
"color blind."6' 1 Discrimination on the basis of ancestry was allowed in the
Japanese Exclusion Cases,6 2 but only because of the immediate danger of
enemy invasion. In violating its own rule, the Court was careful to point
out that "distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality."6' 3 The underlying "justification" for benign quotas
does not meet the extreme standards of necessity set in the Exclusion Cases.
The question remains whether to create a new exception to existing law
which would subordinate individual rights to an overall plan for maintaining
integration in housing. Such a step, however, assumes the efficacy of a racial
quota system. The Banks opinion, to the contrary, clearly demonstrates that
such a system may perpetuate pre-existing patterns of racial inequality.
Furthermore, as the Progress court noted,
if a population quota of 80 to 20 founded upon unrecorded restrictive
agreements is constitutional, then a quota of 50 to 50 or 99 to 1 or even
100 to 0 would be constitutional and Shelley v. Kraerner . . . would be
circumvented.64
In order to prevent this abuse of the benign quota, a court would be forced
to determine the reasonableness of the percentage allocation in each case.
57. Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir.
1957).
58. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C., 1955).
59. A new "open enrollment" policy permits students in Negro and Puerto Rican
areas of the city to request transfers to "designated schools in predominantly white
neighborhoods." N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1960, p. 29, col. 1.
60. See note 44 supra.
61. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
62. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
64. Progress opinion at 55.
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Since reasonableness is a matter of opinion, a segregation-minded court might
find "reasonable" a quota which served to propagate its particular social bias.
Moreover, such determinations could not be reviewed unless the higher court
adopted a general practice of reevaluating the discretionary conclusions of
lower state and federal judges. Because the validity of the quota system is
questionable, therefore, the incursion on fundamental rights which its accept-
ance would entail should not be countenanced.
The fundamental error of a quota system is its assumption that Negroes
are different from other citizens and should be treated differently. In this
respect it is no different than a system of planned segregation. For although
a benign quota plan "may appear attractive to Negroes at the particular
moment in a particular place .... it would constitute a strait jacket. It is but
a mess of pottage offered in exchange for a birthright of equality."0' 5
65. Ibid.
